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COMMENT
GIFTS-DELIVERY-CHOSES IN ACTION
In the case of In re Russell's Estate, 385 Pa. 557, 123 A.2d 708 (1956),
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court indicated that it has not relaxed the require-
ment of delivery in the gratuitous transfer of a chose in action not represented
by some tangible instrument.
In November of 1952 decedent gave to appellant a check for $55,000.
He told her that at a later time he might want some of the money back but
that the rest was to be split between her and her brother. The money was
deposited in appellant's account. She did not add it to the account balance
but noted it as a separate item against the initials of the deceased. About a
year later decedent requested a return of $20,000, telling appellant that the
rest was hers as a wedding gift and reaffirming that she was to share it equally
with her brother. Appellant noted the withdrawal against the initial entry.
Several weeks later decedent died. The widow, taking against the will, pro-
tested the failure to include the amount in the estate. The lower court found
there had been a gift to appellant and her brother of $17,500 each.
In reversing the decision of the lower court the Supreme Court held that
the transaction of November, 1952, gave rise to a debtor-creditor relationship.
Therefore, at the time of the second transaction the decedent had merely a
chose in action to give; and that when a chose in action is not embodied in
an instrument which is the tangible representative of the obligation, the law
requires either the delivery of a receipt acknowledging payment in full, a writ-
ten assignment, or some equivalent act or instrument.
The problem in the Russell case has plagued the courts ever since it was
recognized that choses in action, originally not transferable at all,1 could be
the subject of gift or transfer. Recent decisions have relaxed the requirement
of delivery for gifts of choses in action.' This relaxation is based on the rec-
ognition of the theory that legal delivery is largely a matter of intention; and,
therefore, where intention is clear, delivery should be found.3 Despite this
readiness to relax the rule, most courts adhere, at least in dicta, to the follow-
' BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY, § 58 (2d ed. 1955).
2 Millet v. Temple, 280 Mass. 543, 182 N.E. 921 (1932) (failure to request repayment for
twelve years held sufficient act of delivery); Lewis' Estate, 139 Pa. 640, 22 At. 635 (1891) (inter-
est indorsed on backs of mortgage retained by mortgagee held good gift); Campbell's Estate, 274
Pa. 546, 118 At. 547 (1922) (gift of check drawn on decedent's savings account but not cashed
before his death held a good gift of the account).
3 Scott v. Union and Planters Bank and Trust Co., 123 Tenn. 258, 130 S.W. 757 (1910).
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ing declaration in Kent's Commentaries: 4 "If the thing given be a chose in
action, the law requires an assignment, or some equivalent instrument, and
the transfer must be actually executed." '
Before the Russell case the Pennsylvania court had evinced an apparent
liberal trend in allowing the oral gratuitous transfer of a debt. Two cases
should be compared.
In 1904 the court decided the case of Hawn v. Stoler.' The deceased, ill
and on her way to the hospital, committed to her friend for safekeeping $595.
The friend deposited the money in the bank in her own name. Later, fearing
the death of the alleged donor, she made a request as to the disposition of
the fund. The deceased told her friend to give $300 to her sister. In an action
against the executor by the alleged donee for payment of the $300 the court
said that there was no gift. "The money was transformed from a chattel in
the possession of deceased, into a chose in action. Therefore she had nothing
to give except a chose in action, and to transfer this the law requires an assign-
ment or some equivalent instrument and the transfer must be actually exe-
cuted."
In 1953 the same question was before the court." This time the deceased
had a savings account. Desiring to make a gift of it he asked the alleged donee,
who was caring for him, to give his bank book to an agent of the debtor-bank
and to tell the agent to visit the deceased. The alleged donee did this, and
that afternoon the debtor's agent went to visit the deceased. The deceased
then told the agent that he desired the donee to have the fund. The agent
agreed to make the change, but before he did so the deceased died. In sus-
taining the gift the court said, quoting from Bogert, Trusts and Trustees,8 "An
oral direction to the bank to pay the intended donee, accepted by the bank,
has been held to effect a gift of the account."
The court in In re Russel distinguishes this case on the ground that the
direction to the debtor was accompanied by the delivery of the bank book to
the donee and by the latter to the bank. But Pennsylvania law is definite that
the mere handing of a bank book, even though accompanied by words, is not
a sufficient delivery to constitute a gift of the account.' It must follow that
'Vol. 2, §439 (12th ed. 1893).
5 For an excellent illustration of this see Millet v. Temple, supra note 3.
6 Hawn v. Stoler, 208 Pa. 610, 57 Ati. 1115 (1904).
7 Bloses' Estate, 374 Pa. 100, 97 A.2d 358 (1953), noted in 58 DICK. L. REV. 88.
8 Vol. IA, § 142, p. 22.
"Walsh's Appeal, 122 Pa. 177, 15 At. 470 (1888); Kata's Estate, 363 Pa. 359, 7 A.2d 351
(1950).
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the delivery of a bank book prior in time to the oral direction did not consti-
tute a good gift; and, therefore, at the time of the oral direction the dece-
dent had a mere chose in action to give. Although this direction was unexe-
cuted at the time of his death, the court concluded that a completed transfer
had been made.
In both the Hawn and the Blose cases the gift of a debt was in issue. It
is suggested by the writer that both cases could have been decided on contract
law. To have done so the court would have had to find a legally sufficient
consideration for the debtor's promise. This would have required the imply-
ing of a release to the debtor in exchange for his promise to pay the donee,
or a novation in which the presence and assent of all parties-creditor, debtor,
and donee-would have been required. The court did not seem to decide on
such a basis. It said: "What deceased did was to assign a chose in action by
acknowledging as much to his debtor and obtaining from the latter an agree-
ment to pay the debt to the assignee." 1" The court could not have intended
that a mere acknowledgment to the debtor of his intention to make a gift
coupled with the debtor's assent created a binding contract. Confirming of in-
tention to give is not a sufficient consideration for the debtor's promise. The
court also noted that had the debtor paid, the creditor would then have been
estopped from bringing an action for recovery of the money from the debtor.
If contract were the basis of the court's decision, then the promise being unexe-
cuted and the debtor having suffered no detriment, estoppel would not have
served as a substitute for a legally sufficient consideration.
Whatever implications may have been created by the Blose decision are
put at rest by the instant case. The court does not hesitate in arriving at its
position that delivery is something independent of the intention to transfer,
and a mere oral declaration will not do.
That the court was not prepared to follow the Blose decision to its ulti-
mate conclusion is confirmed in its refusal to allow the gift to the brother.
Here were the very elements upon which the court in the Blose case said its
decision was based. At the time of the second transaction between the de-
ceased and appellant, deceased told appellant that she was to give half of the
remainder to her brother. Appellant accepted on that basis. There was the
oral direction to the debtor, an acknowledgment to the debtor, and an assent
on the part of the debtor.
It is not the purpose of this comment to criticize or defend the rule re-
quiring a delivery, nor to attempt to determine whether this requirement is
10 Bloses' Estate, supra note 7, at page 102.
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one of substantive law or merely the best evidence of intention. Both have
been the subject of ample analysis."-
One dissenting justice focused on an additional issue summarily decided
by the majority of the court. He pointed out that he agreed with the law ap-
plied to the court's conclusions, but disagreed that a debtor-creditor relation-
ship had arisen and that therefore this law applied. This question could have
vitally affected the outcome of the case and merited more serious consideration.
Where the subject matter of donation is in the possession of the donee, a re-
delivery is a meaningless and useless ceremony, and in the case of gifts inter
vivos the all but unanimous authority is in favor of the validity of the gift
without any formal delivery. 2 In this case upon deposit of the $55,000 an
obligation arose on behalf of the bank to pay, upon demand, the appellant.
There is no evidence that appellant treated this obligation as her own by add-
ing it to the balance of her account. Rather the evidence shows that she merely
noted the amount as a separate item against deceased's initials. The majority
recognizes this, for it states in the opinion that "she was receiving it merely
as a custodian with a definite obligation to return it or any, part of it on de-
mand." 1"
It would seem that such facts more nearly comprise the elements of a
bailment. The inability to return the exact money does not defeat this con-
clusion, for by modern authority there may be a bailment even though there
is a constantly changing mass of fungible goods." Applying this law, the
court could have decided that the problem of delivery was not in issue and
that intent alone would control.
It should be open to question, however, whether in the same setting a re-
sult must depend on whether the initial transaction is called a bailment or a
debt, in one case the intention alone being enough, and in the other something
more being required. To do so makes the requirement of delivery seem some-
what meaningless, or at best confirms the theory that delivery is merely the
best evidence of intention. When intention is clear, as it was here, in fairness
to the donor, the gift should not fail.
JOHN F. KRADEL
"Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in Action Evi-
denced by Commercial Instruments, 21 ILL. L. REV. 341 (1926); Williston, Gifts of Rights Under
Contracts in Writing by Delivery of the Writing, 40 YALE L. REV. 1; COMMENT, 6 FORDHAM L.
REV. 106.
12 Wing v. Merchant, 57 Me. 383 (1869) (funds of father in custody of daughter, from which
she gave him from time to time such sums as he requested; held good gift by words of donation
alone); BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY, § 44 (2d ed. 1955).
Is 385 Pa. at 559, 123 A.2d at 711.
14BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY, § 78 (2d ed. 1955).
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